找出是誰抄襲我的圖片作品!

今天看到一則新聞,由政府主辦的「著作權海報設計比賽」,校園組首獎竟然是抄襲國外藝術家的作品!這倒是提醒大家注意著作權的重要性了(完全凸顯比賽主題),也許這就是參賽者的本意??好啦,這不是今天講古的重點,這件事引發凱撒之鷹另一個想法--要如何在網路上找到別人抄襲你的圖片作品呢?

注意喔,這裡所指的「抄襲」並不是純粹盜圖,而是你的創作圖片被拿去修改後,變成另一張雷同度極高的圖片,如果沒有人跟你說,自己要怎麼發現有這件事呢?

先跳開話題一下,如果是想知道文章有沒有被抄襲,那用Google比對文字是還蠻簡單的,只要拿文章中的某一串句子去做搜尋(最好前後加上 "  " 引號夾註起來),就能很快找出相同或類似的句子。但是Google只能用關鍵字去搜尋圖片,雖然文字搜尋方面很強,卻無法直接「以圖找圖」,所以Google大神這時候就派不上用場了。


這裡介紹一個專門「搜尋相似圖片」的搜尋引擎 TinEye,它的專長就是以圖找圖:你先上傳一張圖片(或圖片網址)給它,TinEye 就會幫你比對網路上幾十億張圖片,然後挑出類似的圖片給你看,這樣就很容易知道有沒有被抄襲修改了。

TinEye網站 http://www.tineye.com 

實作示範

以前面那則抄襲國外作品的新聞為例,如果在沒有人發現的情況下,要怎麼用 TinEye 找出它可能有抄襲某張圖片呢?方法很簡單:

1. 我是在聯合新聞網上面看到這則新聞,裡面有疑似抄襲作品的圖片,那我只要先把圖片的網址複製起來。當然如果一開始並沒有新聞報導,那你在現場把照片拍起來存進硬碟裡也行。
2. 接著到 TinEye 網站,把要比對的圖片網址貼上去,再按下[Search]鈕進行比對。如果是自己硬碟裡的圖片,就用左邊的[選擇檔案]鈕來上傳。
3. 比對結果馬上就出來了,果然網路上有一張圖片非常相似,可能就是當初「參考」的原圖。
4. 點擊圖片下方的「Compare」連結,還能讓兩張圖片更進一步比對。它會把圖片重疊放在一樣的位置,你按[Switch]鈕反覆切換來切換去,就能更清楚看出哪裡被修改過了。
5. 只有找到一張類似圖片,也許能證明來源圖片有抄襲,但原圖的創作者是誰呢?雖然所找到的圖片會有附上網址,不過以此例而言,它是被收錄在某個圖庫網站中的 一張圖片,並不是原作者本身的網站。沒關係,我們用同樣方式繼續找下去,把找到圖片的連結網址再copy起來,重新用TinEye進行搜尋看看。
6. 這下找到更多一樣的圖片了,接下來就要考驗耐心,一個個點進去看看,也許就能找到原作者的網站囉!這種偵探式的搜索就留給有緣人去做吧 =_=


轉自 http://pcuser.pixnet.net/blog/post/27229135

3 Phases of Malware Analysis:Behavioral, Code, and Memory Forensics

When discussing malware analysis, I’ve always referred to 2 main phases of the process: behavioral analysis and code analysis. It’s time to add a third major component: memory analysis.
Here’s a brief outline of each phase:


  • Behavioral analysis examines the malware specimen’s interactions with its environment: the file system, the registry (if on Windows), the network, as well as other processes and OS components. As the malware investigator notices interesting behavioral characteristics, he modifies the laboratory environment to evoke new characteristics. To perform this work, the investigator typically infects the isolated system while having the necessary monitoring tools observe the specimen’s execution. Some of the free tools that can help in this analysis phase are Process Monitor, Process Explorer, RegShot and Wireshark. Several free on-line tools can automate some aspects of behavioral analysis; there are also several free frameworks you can use to script the analysis process in a local lab.
  • Code analysis reverse-engineers the malicious program to understand the code that implements the specimen’s behavior. When looking at compiled programs, this process involves using a disassembler, a debugger and, perhaps, a decompiler to examine the program’s low-level assembly or byte-code instructions. A disassembler converts the instructions from their binary form into the human-readable assembly form. A decompiler attempts to recreate the original source code of the program. A debugger lets the analyst step through the most interesting parts of the code, interacting with it and observing the effects of its instructions to understand their purpose. OllyDbg and IDA Pro Freeware are popular free disassembler/debuggers that can handle Windows programs.
  • Memory analysis examines memory of the infected system to extract artifacts relevant to the malicious program. In the context of reverse-engineering malware, memory analysis can help identify malicious code that is trying to hide itself (i.e., rootkits), can clarify the program’s run-time dependencies, and can explain how the specimen was used on the victim’s system. Memory analysis saves time and allows the investigator to take shortcuts when studying the specimen’s behavior or code. Free tools for performing memory analysis are The Volatility Framework and its malware-related plugins, as well as Memoryze and the associated Audit Viewer program.


The three malware analysis phases are intertwined with each other. The investigator might start with behavioral analysis to get a quick sense for the specimen’s capabilities, then reinforce the initial findings by looking at its code, then explore additional aspects of the malicious program by examining the infected system’s memory. The investigator will keep jumping between phases, not necessarily in any particular order, until he or she develops a sufficient understanding of the specimen’s capabilities.


轉自 SANS

找回消失的記憶〔SD卡照片救援實錄〕

轉自 http://blackjack.blog.ithome.com.tw/post/110/82057

一趟旅行回來,滿心期待的要從裝滿歡樂回憶的記憶卡取出數位照片,記憶卡卻在此時壞了!遇到這種狀況時千萬不要慌,只要找到救援軟體,你還是很有機會救回大多數的寶貴資料。而這些資料救援方法,同時也適用於誤刪的硬碟檔案。

 
雙十節的那個周末,我包下了埔里一家有溫泉游泳池的民宿,辦了一個兩天一夜的家族旅遊,可以說是有史以來最成功的一次,也是大家玩得最歡樂的一次。
周日回到家後,例行性的打開電腦,取出相機的記憶卡,插入讀卡機,接著開始把SD卡的照片搬到電腦內。
悲劇發生了!


看著PC檔案夾裡的照片,只出現了兩張,第三張時,只複製到一點點,記憶卡就卡住了!然後,電腦死當。試了再試,完全沒有任何選擇,只能重新開機。
果不其然,最壞的事情發生了。記憶卡已經無法讀取。用電腦、用相機,都無法讀取。只出現要求你將SD卡「格式化」的訊息。 而在這次旅遊中,大家都靠勢有個人帶了一台單眼相機,所以沒有其他人有拿出相機拍任何照片。
格或不格?That’s the question!



最後,我做了正確的決定:不格!保留全屍才是最重要的!要格隨時都可格,但若格式化之後對原始資料有任何損害,都將無法挽回。〔後來事實也證明如此。〕



基本原理
在開始救援之前,先說明一下淺顯的基本原理。〔已了解的就請跳過,很懂的若要看就請手下留情。〕
在遇到SD卡壞掉時,不要慌張,凡走過必留下痕跡,資料多數情況下是可以救得回來的。
資料救援的基本原理是這樣的:不論是儲存在你的SD卡、CF卡,或是硬碟機……等等儲 存媒體裡的資料,當你刪除或怎樣(例如壞掉)而不見時,它也只是「不見」(看不見)而已,而不是真的消失。也就是說:資料很可能都還在儲存媒體裡,只是透 過電腦一般的檔案管理系統讓你看不到而已。


這些資料在怎樣的情況下才會真的消失?一般來說,當資料儲存滿了之後,新進來的資料把舊的資料取代掉之後,舊資料才會真的在儲存媒體裡消失。或者,資料所儲存的位置,剛好儲存媒體有實體的損壞。最後,可能得用上專業的資料刪除軟體經過正確處理才可能讓它真正消失。


總之:你越能保留全屍,也就是保持SD卡(或硬碟)最後的狀態,盡量不要做出任何可能碰觸資料的動作(例如將它格式化,或是繼續儲存更多資料進去),越有可能救回更多的資料。
這個原理反過來看,也有個資料安全的相關問題。
假設有那麼一天,當你要丟棄你的硬碟或SD卡,或者要消滅數位證據,毀屍滅跡時,不要以為你把資料從電腦上刪除它就永久消失了。


假設你電腦上存很多不宜外流的照片……或是自己一些重要的機密性資料(像是銀行帳號資料或自然人憑證………)
然後有那麼一天要換電腦了,資料全都殺光光,或者是硬碟其實也有給他格式化。接著,電腦就給他送上網路拍賣………


再假設你電腦剛好賣給一個窮極無聊的阿宅,沒事把你的硬碟拿來「資料救援」,將所有你以為已刪除的資料給救回來了………後果當然不堪設想。
事實上,我記得以前就曾有讀過一些相關報告(一時之間找不到),國外就有資料安全公司 到網拍上購買許多二手硬碟回去做研究,就發現到多數廢棄的硬碟都沒真正做好資料刪除。這一方面的議題,不是今日重點,所以點到為止。〔正在考慮那天是不是 去網拍買幾顆來救援,然後寫篇報告?〕


結論是:遇到SD卡毀損的情況,絕對絕對不要對它作任何動作,不要順著電腦的提示就給它格式化下去!


開始救援
在這三天期間,我在網路上爬文,在噗浪上發出求救。細節就不談了,總之,最後我使用了四套軟體。在此以說明四套軟體的使用狀況與結果為主。由於這些軟體的安裝、使用都非常簡單,所以也不詳細介紹了。
Digital Image Recovery
首先,我使用了Digital Image Recovery這套免費軟體。
這套軟體的來源有點複雜,我們看PC home還有軟體王講的都不一樣,更別說網友部落格的貼文了。一套軟體若來源不明,我並不建議大家使用,因為「中標」的機會很大。
據我追查,這套軟體的原創公司為Alexander Grau,該公司的資料救援軟體則是透過另一家專業的資料救援公司LC Technology International Inc.在發布。(這也是PC home和軟體王說法不一樣的原因。)
可是,目前這套免費軟體似乎在兩家公司的網站上找不到了。下載點分布在網路其他地方。看倌可自行前往軟體王和PC home找出連結。
相關網站:
>> Alexander Grau
>> LC technology(http://www.lc-tech.com/
>> 軟體王的介紹
>> PC home土給 

這是我救援SD卡的第一款軟體。很幸運的,這套軟體成功救回了九成的照片(542/591),更幸運的是,其中家族的活動照片,全數救回──不過這是我在未將記憶卡格式化之前。
由於這次照片救援的重點是家族活動照片,至於民宿的一些資料照片(就是沒有人在裡面的景物照)我比較不在意,因為下回去再拍就有:但家族活動照,總不能叫大家再回去重演一次。
總之,成功救回重要照片之後,我就開始放心而手賤了:對於電腦一直出現的「格式化」要求,竟有一次沒用大腦的給他按了下去。
但其實,我還是想救回那剩下的一成照片。
於是,我在把SD卡格式化之後,又重新以這套軟體嘗試一次。結果:大失敗!一張照片也沒有找回。看到掃瞄資料,我大概知道,SD卡損壞嚴重。


PC Inspector Smart Recovery 4.5
OK!既然格式化之後,前一套軟體原本救得回資料,現在救不回來了,那真的有得PK了!我對於那一套軟體可以成功救回已被我破壞的資料(甚至救回更多資料)更有興趣了。
第二款軟體,我找上了PC Inspector Smart Recovery 4.5。 網路上有人在教人如何救回照片,推薦的是這家公司另一款軟體PC Inspector File Recovery,其實有點不大對,這款軟體應該較適合一般檔案資料的回復/救援。對於救援SD卡或其他各式記憶卡的照片,應該選擇PC Inspector Smart Recovery比較適合。
這家德國公司真是大恩大德,這樣的軟體,也是完全免費提供,這也是這次試驗的軟體中:出身明確,然後又完全免費的一套,所以我相當推薦。
>> PC Inspector Smart Recovery下載點
>> PC Inspector File Recovery下載點
此外,這套軟體應該好好介紹一下,因為它讓我學了很多──另一種說法是繞了很大一段冤枉路。
由於這款軟體在我的Windows 7電腦上安裝後有問題,竟說機碼(registry)錯誤(不見得是軟體問題,可能是OS)。
run-time error'339', component gif89.dll or one of its dependencies not correctly registered: a file missing or invalid.
總之,害我又研究了清除機碼的軟體,清了好幾次機碼,還有個什麼gif89.dll……,但最後還是不能執行。於是只好將它安裝在家裡另一台小筆電上。
裝好軟體,開啟了記憶卡後,軟體就告訴我:檔案毀損很嚴重,意思大概是要我選擇比較慢的掃瞄模式。也沒得選了,就選「是」!
可是呢,一整晚上下來只執行了10%,我只好將已找出的近200張照片取出,其餘的讓它繼續執行…… (案,這個10%是與SD卡裡的總檔案數去換,而不只是我最後所拍的那591張照片)
最後擺了24小時之後,它只執行了80%,……
重點是,它所找出的那些JPG照片,雖然看來檔案大小正確,但卻無法預覽,也無法開啟。…改名,改運,換軟體……全都無用。

問題在那我完全不知,唯一的線索是我以IrfanView開啟檔案時看到Can't read file header! Unknown file format!的錯誤訊息,於是往JPEG Header的問題去找答案。

在Google研究之後,覺得應該朝修正JPG檔的header方向走。於是找了幾個JPEG Recovery,或是JPEG Fixer……等等一堆修復JPG圖檔的軟體,結果都沒用。這些軟體都跟我在打滾耍賴說那不是肯德雞!
最後我只好把希望放在jheader這套軟體了。聽說這套軟體很強大,執行很快──but, but,………得回到DOS時代!而這也是它執行超級快速的原因〔不知有幾個看倌認得DOS這三個字?它是什麼,看後面就知。〕
我硬著頭皮,下載了這個軟體。仔細詳讀說明,說明並不是很清楚,只大概知道-te這個指令可以移植照片的exif header資訊。
於是不知試了這個指令多少次,最後被我試對了。但結果一樣:它也耍賴說這不是肯德雞!

 

經過一整天的挫敗,繞了一大圈,一切功虧一簣。不過,或許還是有方法解開這些資料,只是我沒找到答案(若有人知道也歡迎告訴我)。若是如此,那這套軟體還是不錯的!


SanDisk的RescurePRO
第三套是網友向我推薦的:SanDisk的RescurePRO。
這套軟體是知名記憶卡業者SanDisk的,但只有在部份SanDisk產品才有綑綁。有捆綁該軟體者,可以透過產品序號下載,然後以序號取得金鑰啟用軟體。
如果沒有,那麼就必需跟LC Technology購買。LC Technology所提供的免費Demo版(就是未啟用的),只能掃瞄,不能儲存(這實在沒有任何意義)。
相關網站:
http://www.lc-tech.com/rescuepro/
http://kb.sandisk.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/43
不過,最後證明這套軟體不錯。總計成功幫我救回了9成6的照片(569/591),比在未格式化(未破壞到檔案)之前,Digital Image Recovery幫我救回的9成還多。
▽ 下方藍色部份一就是找到的照片,全選之後選擇檔案的儲存位置即可(不過這套軟體的中文化做得有點糟,簡繁字混在一起外,存檔的按鍵竟寫開啟)



FinalData
最後是小狐狸推薦的這一套。據小狐說,長期使用這套,相當可靠,一直成功救回很多資料。其實我用過後之後也相信小狐狸的說法,只是,我這SD卡可能真的傷得不輕....
>> FinalData標準本下載
 >> FinalData企業版下載
這套軟體是Final Data公司所有,提供14天免費試用。要救照片其實一天也就夠了。其執行速度和SanDisk RescurePRO差不多,用我的win 7電腦大概在一、兩個小時就執行完畢。
看到跑出來的預覽圖,以及算一算照片的數字:竟然後SanDisk的都一樣。〔所以那可能就是能救回的照片的極限了〕。
但問題又來了:最後存檔之後,打開照片,全部都殘缺不全。甚至,照片再改以大圖預覽,馬上就現出原形………再細看救回的照片,每張都只有幾百K,和原本該有的幾M差了近十倍的大小。
▽ 小圖預覽沒問題 好像照片都已成功救回

▽ 大圖預覽或是打開照片之後才發現,圖檔都不完整



結論
簡單說
1、遇到SD卡、CF卡……等記憶卡毀損等問題,千萬先不要格式化。不要對記憶卡做任何事。
2、產品使用心得部份:在這次救援中SanDisk的RescurePRO的救援最為成功,在卡不小心格式化之後,591張照片還成功救出了569張,救援率達96%。
3、雖然後三款沒在SD卡格式化之前使用過。但足夠的理由讓我相信,它們在SD卡未格式化之前應該能夠救回資料。若以這個假設為前題,那麼完全免費又有公司保證的PC Inspector Smart Recovery應該是最適合一般想要免費使用軟體的使用者。
最後我要強調一下,這並不是一次什麼產品評測,只是簡單的產品使用心得;因為我甚至沒有仔細去調校或設定這些軟體,或許有什麼更強大的特殊功能我沒發現也不一定.我相信,萬一那一天你遇到類似的問題,這幾款軟體都值得試試








轉自 http://blackjack.blog.ithome.com.tw/post/110/82057

Free Toolkits for Automating Malware ...

Free Toolkits for Automating Malware Analysis


Automating some aspects of malware analysis is critical for organizations that process large numbers of malicious programs. Such automation allows analysts to focus on the tasks that require human insights. There are several free toolkits you can use as the starting point for building your own automated malware analysis lab. The focus of this post is on the tools you can install locally; I wrote about free web-based behavioral analysis services earlier.
Two feature-rich and highly customizable options are outlined below:


There are several other toolkits you may find useful for automating aspects of behavioral malware analysis:
  • Zero Wine by Joxean Koret is a full-featured tool for dynamically analyzing the behavior of Windows malware by running it within the WINE emulator on Linux.
  • Buster Sandbox Analyzer by Buster is a wrapper around the Sandboxie tool for Windows, which helps you examine the key actions of applications executed by Sandboxie in your lab.
  • Malheur by Konrad Rieck is a very promising tool for analyzing the volumes of data collected by behavioral sandboxes.
  • REMnux by yours truly is a lightweight Linux distribution for assisting malware analysts in reverse-engineering malicious software.


If you’re interested in building your own malware analysis toolkit manual behavioral review, take a look at the article I wrote earlier. You may also be interested in reading about the limitations of automated malware analysis.
Lenny Zeltser



轉自 http://blog.zeltser.com/post/1284687696/malware-analysis-tool-frameworks

Free Automated Malware Analysis Services

Free Automated Malware Analysis Services

In my SANS Institute course, I teach security and systems professionals how to reverse-engineer malicious software. It is an interesting, but time-consuming process if you don't have the right skills and tools at hand.
There are several free automated malware analysis services that can examine compiled Windows executables to save us time and provide a sense about the specimen's capabilities:

These are the services I have come across. If you know of another reliable and free service I didn't list, please let me know.
My other lists of on-line security resources outline Blocklists of Suspected Malicious IPs and URLs and On-Line Tools for Malicious Website Lookups.

About the Author: Lenny Zeltser leads the security consulting practice at Savvis, where he focuses on designing and operating security programs for cloud-based IT infrastructure. Lenny's other area of specialization is malicious software; he teaches how to analyze and combat malware at SANS Institute. Lenny explores security topics at conferences, in books and in articles. He also volunteers as an incident handler at the Internet Storm Center. You can follow Lenny on Twitter and read his blog.


轉自 http://zeltser.com/reverse-malware/automated-malware-analysis.html

搞不懂個資法?七個實例告訴你




個 人資料保護法已於2010年5月26日經總統明令公布,但相關的施行細則目前還付之闕如。這段期間也許是因為新法上路,許多民眾對自身的權益仍不熟悉,或 是企業本身對於這部法令還抱持觀望的態度,甚至是主管機關,對於自身所該扮演的角色及應擔負的責任,仍然不是那麼清楚。我們希望從近日發現的一些實例,來 解釋一下這些事件背後所牽涉到的相關條文。同時也希望藉由個案討論,引發更多人對這部法令的關注。

現象一:
公司所有處理客戶基本資料的電腦設備,全部置放於國外的區域中心內,因為機器設備不在台灣,所以不受新版個資法的限制。

說明:一般民眾或有以為,只要主機或網路設備不設在台灣地區,便可規避我國法規之適用。

依 照「個人資料保護法」第二條,對國際傳輸的定義為將個人資料作跨國(境)之處理或利用。而根據第二十一條規定,非公務機關為國際傳輸個人資料,而有如涉及 國家重大利益、以迂迴方法向第三國(地區)傳輸個人資料規避本法等情形者,中央目的事業主管機關得限制之;同時第四十一條亦指出,違反中央目的事業主管機 關限制國際傳輸之命令或處分,足生損害於他人者,將處二年以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科新臺幣二十萬元以下罰金。

另涉及行政罰規定,如 違反第六條第一項、第十五條、第十六條、第十九條、第二十條第一項規定,或中央目的事業主管機關依第二十一條限制國際傳輸之命令或處分,足生損害於他人 者,則根據第四十三條規定,中華民國人民在中華民國領域外對中華民國人民犯前二條之罪者,亦適用之。可見即便是機器設備沒有在中華民國境內,公司仍然受 「個人資料保護法」的規範。

現象二:
現行許多企業都會藉由研討會或講座的方式,由與會人士提供推薦名單,以便日後做後續業務推廣使用,個資法通過後,仍可透過這種方式來取得潛在客戶資料。

說 明:依照「個人資料保護法」第十九條規定,非公務機關對個人資料之蒐集或處理,應有特定目的,並符合法律明文等相關規定。另依據第九條規定,於處理或利用 前向當事人告知即可。因此,如果仍使用以往的蒐集方式,但沒有告知當事人,就不能處理或利用這些資料,也就是說,企業無法再藉由這種管道取得個人資料,除 非當事人同意。

現象三:
某會員俱樂部近日推出「老客戶回娘家方案」,廣發邀請函及簡訊,希望未續約的會員能重新簽約並享有優惠。

說 明:依照個資法第十九條與當事人有契約或類似契約之關係,此方案的實施並不違法。惟根據第十一條,個人資料蒐集之特定目的消失或期限屆滿時,應主動或依當 事人之請求,刪除、停止處理或利用該個人資料。同時,根據第十三條公務機關或非公務機關受理當事人之請求,可將個人資料使用時間延長,但不得超過一定期 限,並應將其原因以書面通知請求人。由上可知,當契約關係已經不存在時,企業應主動將所蒐集到的個人資料,停止使用。

現象四:
某連鎖店在促銷廣告上聲稱,為配合個資法的修訂,請會員主動更新會員資料,以便日後能取得各項優惠的折扣。

說 明:既然是會員,依照個資法第十九條,企業係與當事人有契約或類似契約之關係,此方案的實施並不違法。惟根據第八條,公務機關或非公務機關向當事人蒐集個 人資料時,應明確告知當事人公務機關或非公務機關名稱、蒐集目的、使用方式等事項。同時,根據第十五條規定,公務機關對個人資料之蒐集或處理,應有特定目 的,並經當事人書面同意。此「書面」同意,目前根據法務部解釋,除非係以電子簽章方式為之者,否則應取得當事人的「紙本」書面同意始符合法定要件,企業應 留意此點要求。

現象五:
客戶攜帶所購買的家電用品進行維修,並提供個人連絡電話、電子郵件在維修紀錄單上,以便維修結果通知。客戶在取得維修的商品時,要求商家交還維修紀錄單,因上面有客戶所提供的個人資料。

說 明:依據個資法第十五條規定,公務機關對個人資料之蒐集或處理,應有特定目的,並經當事人書面同意,因此商家是不需要將維修紀錄單交還給客戶的。而同時依 照第八條規定,公務機關或非公務機關向當事人蒐集個人資料時,應明確告知當事人個人資料利用之期間、地區、對象及方式。因此,商家除非已盡到前述告知義 務,否則不可以將此次維修紀錄單上所取得的個人資料,挪移至其他地方使用。

現象六:
某金融機構欲發行企業聯名卡,該金融機構從合作企業處取得會員資料,並且廣發宣傳,鼓勵企業會員申請聯名卡,並要求留下個人資料,以利行銷作業使用。

說 明:依據個資法第九條指出,公務機關或非公務機關蒐集非由當事人提供之個人資料,應於處理或利用前,向當事人告知個人資料來源。另依據第八條規定,公務機 關或非公務機關向當事人蒐集個人資料時,若沒有取得書面同意,同時未將使用目的明確告訴當事人,都是違反個資法的行為。

現象七:
某公職人員參選人,聲稱透過支持者提供的資料,大量寄發競選文宣,並宣稱前述行為是不在個資法規範的範圍內。

說明:依據個資法第二條對非公務機關的定義,包含自然人、法人或其他團體,因此,該公職人員參選人同樣也受個資法第九條及第八條,公務機關或非公務機關蒐集非由當事人提供之個人資料,應於處理或利用前,向當事人告知個人資料來源的規範。
結論
雖 然新法剛剛上路,但我們仍然殷切的希望主管機關,能夠確實的訂出符合產業要求的施行細則,同時要能徹底落實,另一方面,則要思考如何強化一般大眾對個資法 的認知,以保障自身權益,更重要的是,各單位要能確實檢討現行內部各項與個人資料相關的制度,包括資料的蒐集、處理、使用、傳輸及銷毀,如此才能達到三贏 的效果,這也才是個資法當初修法的目的。



(本文作者現任職於管理顧問公司)



轉自http://www.isecutech.com.tw/article/article_detail.aspx?tv=71&aid=5915


FTK Imager 3

FTK Imager has always been the crème de la crème of free forensic tools and now with the introduction of FTK Imager 3 it is even better.


Access Data have added some amazing functionality to this programs already extensive list of capabilities - in fact to steal a phrase - its almost magical and it is certainly available at an unbelievable price. So what am I referring to?
The answer of course is the new image mounting feature which allows a user to mount an image as a drive or physical device. Encase evidence files, Smart image files, Advanced Forensic Format images and dd images are supported.



Additionally Encase Logical Evidence Files and Access Data's AD1 custom content images can be mounted logically. Full details in the Release Notes.


This functionality is accessed via File/Image Mounting

















In this screen shot I have chosen to mount a drive from a Mac which includes a Bootcamp partition















This resulted in the EFI partition, the HFS+ partition and the NTFS Bootcamp partition all being given a drive letter. The whole drive is allocated the Physical Drive Number 4 in this example.


All of these resources are now available natively upon the machine that FTK Imager 3 is running on. The Physical Disk however is not listed in Disk Management nor does this functionality appear to install any devices within Device Manager.
Logical mounting of non windows partitions (HFS+, EXT3 et al) will present an explorer view of these file systems as FTK imager itself sees them (à la Encase VFS).


This functionality provides many benefits and at first look at least, renders the costly alternatives of PFS/VFS and Mount Image Pro redundant. It also raises the bar in how we can construct virtual machines from images due to the ability to mount more than one drive at once, thus simplifying the creation of multi drive VMs. The functionality also facilitates non techies (lawyers, fraud investigators et al ) to easily peruse images.


FTK Imager 3 also introduces support for VXFS, ex FAT and EXT4 file systems. As we sometimes say in England its the dogs..

轉自http://forensicsfromthesausagefactory.blogspot.com/2010/10/ftk-imager-3.html

Challenges of Windows physical memory acquisition and exploitatio

A Forensic Analysis Of The Windows Registry

A Forensic Analysis Of The Windows Registry

Derrick J. Farmer
Champlain College
Burlington, Vermont
dfarmer03@gmail.com

(click here for a revised, quick reference PDF version of this paper)

Abstract
This paper will introduce the Microsoft Windows Registry database and explain how critically important a registry examination is to computer forensics experts. In essence, the paper will discuss various types of Registry 'footprints' and delve into examples of what crucial information can be obtained by performing an efficient and effective forensic examination. Many of the Registry keys that are imperative and relevant to an examination will also be discussed.

Acknowledgments
This paper is primarily a product of research, but may also serve as a reference to a Windows registry examination. For the sake of simplicity, there will only be reference to the Windows XP operating system - Even though earlier versions of Windows utilize the Registry, contain similar characteristics, and even apply many of the same concepts. The reasons XP was chosen to be discussed over other versions of Windows is because it remains popular and very widely used among average computer users, thus the chance of encountering it in a forensic examination is higher. Windows XP is still very current and much of the same information can still be applied to previous versions of Windows. The illustrations throughout this paper are intended to provide a better understanding of the subject being discussed. All of the screenshot images contained in this paper were captured from the Windows XP system in which the research was conducted on. The P2P client programs that were downloaded, installed, used, and examined were for the purpose of research use only. Searches were conducted and files were downloaded from these networks, not to engage in illegal or malicious activity, but to help provide a better understanding of the software's architecture and how it utilizes the Windows Registry from a forensics standpoint.


Introduction

The Importance of a Registry Examination
Today's society relies heavily on computers and the internet to accomplish everyday tasks, which includes practically everything from communicating and shopping online to banking and investing. It is much more common to send or receive an email than a physical letter. Along with the increasing use of computers and the internet, comes a little problem called computer crime-- facetiously speaking. Computer crimes present exorbitant issues in today's society. Including, but certainly not limited to - fraud, identity theft, phishing, network infiltration, DoS attacks, piracy of copyrighted material, and CP. With computer crimes on the rise, it is becoming extremely crucial for law enforcement officers and digital forensic examiners to understand computer systems and be able to examine them efficiently and effectively. In order to do this a study of how operating systems work must be explored from the inside out. The Registry is the heart and soul of the Microsoft Windows XP operating system and an exponential amount of information can be derived from it.

History
First, it is important to understand what the Registry is, why it exists, and the types of information it contains. Virtually everything done in Windows refers to or is recorded into the Registry. A program called RegMon by Sysinternals can be used to display registry activity in real time. After running this program it is apparent that registry access barely remains idle. The Registry is referenced in one way or another with every action taken by the user.
The Microsoft knowledge database and also the Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Fifth Edition, define the registry as:
A central hierarchical database used in Microsoft Windows 9x, Windows CE, Windows NT, and Windows 2000 used to store information necessary to configure the system for one or more users, applications and hardware devices.
The Registry was first introduced with Windows 95 and has been incorporated into many Microsoft operating systems since. Although some versions slightly differ, they all are essentially composed of the same structure and serve the main purpose as a configuration database. The Registry replaces configuration files that were used in MSDOS, such as config.sys and autoexec.bat. The primary purpose of config.sys was to load device drivers and the primary purposes of autoexec.bat was to run startup programs and set environment variables - the Registry now handles these functions. In addition to replacing DOS configuration files, the Registry also replaces text-based initialization (.ini) files that were introduced in Windows 3.0. The .ini files - specifically win.ini and system.ini - store user settings and operating system parameters.
This very basic history of the Windows Registry, why it was implemented, and some of its functions are the core fundamentals of understanding the structure and what each part of the Registry pertains to.

Structure of the Windows Registry
By opening the Registry Editor (by typing 'regedit' in the run window), the Registry can be seen as one unified 'file system'. The left-hand pane, also known as the key pane contains an organized listing of what appear to be folders. The five most hierarchal folders are called 'hives' and begin with 'HKEY' (an abbreviation for Handle to a Key). Although five hives can be seen, only two of these are actually 'real', HKEY_USERS (HKU) and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM). The other three are shortcuts or aliases to branches within one of the two hives. Each of these five hives is composed of keys, which contain values and subkeys. Values are the names of certain items within a key, which uniquely identify specific values pertaining to the operating system, or to applications that depend upon that value.
A common analogy that is often used to help understand the structure of the Windows Registry is a comparison between it and the Windows Explorer file system, both are very similar in their structures. The key pane of the Registry is much like the hierarchical structure of the left-hand pane in the Windows Explorer file system. The keys and subkeys located within the five main hives are similar to folders and subfolders of Windows Explorer, and a key's value is similar to a file within a folder. In the right-hand pane of the Windows Registry - a value's name is similar to a file's name, its type is similar to a file's extension, and its data is similar to the actual contents of a file.

Figure 1 - Structure of the Windows Registry (CLICK TO ENLARGE)

Root Key Functions:
Below are listed the five hierarchical hives seen in Figure 1, with a very basic description of each. Beside the root key is their commonly referred to abbreviation in parenthesis, which will frequently be referred to as throughout the paper.
1.HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (HKCR)
Information stored here ensures that the correct program opens when it is executed in Windows Explorer. It also contains further details on drag-and-drop rules, shortcuts, and information on the user interface. Alias for: HKLM\Software\Classes
2.HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU)
Contains configuration information for the user who is currently logged into the system, including user's folders, screen colors, and Control Panel settings. Alias for a user specific branch in HKEY_USERS. The generic information usually applies to all users and is HKU\.DEFAULT.
3.HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM)
Contains machine hardware-specific information that the operating system runs on. It includes a list of drives mounted on the system and generic configurations of installed hardware and applications.
4.HKEY_USERS (HKU)
Contains configuration information of all user profiles on the system, which concerns application configurations, and visual settings.
5.HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG (HCU)
Stores information about the systems current configuration. Alias for: HKLM\Config\profile

Examination Tools
Currently, there are many tools available to forensic examiners for extracting evidentiary information from the Registry. The tool used in this paper to analyze and navigate the registry is Registry Editor (regedit.exe). Registry Editor is free and available on any installation of Microsoft Windows XP with administrator privileges.

Registry Examination
The Registry as a Log
All Registry keys contain a value associated with them called the 'LastWrite' time, which is very similar to the last modification time of a file. This value is stored as a FILETIME structure and indicates when the Registry Key was last modified. In reference to the Microsoft Knowledge Base, A FILETIME structure represents the number of 100 nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601. The LastWrite time is updated when a registry key has been created, modified, accessed, or deleted. Unfortunately, only the LastWrite time of a registry key can be obtained, where as a LastWrite time for the registry value cannot.
Harlan Carvey, author of Windows Forensics and Incident Recovery, refers to a tool called Keytime.exe, which allows an examiner to retrieve the LastWrite time of any specific key. Keytime.exe can be downloaded from http://www.windowsir. com/tools.html.
Knowing the LastWrite time of a key can allow a forensic analyst to infer the approximate date or time an event occurred. And although one may know the last time a Registry key was modified, it still remains difficult to determine what value was actually changed. Using the Registry as a log is most helpful in the correlation between the LastWrite time of a Registry key and other sources of information, such as MAC (modified, accessed, or created) times found within the file system. However, a comprehensive discussion of that process is outside the scope of this paper.
Autorun Locations
Autorun locations are Registry keys that launch programs or applications during the boot process. It is generally a good practice to look here depending on the case of examination. For instance, if a computer is suspected to have been involved in a system intrusion case, autorun locations should be looked at. If the user denies their involvement then it's possible their own system was compromised and used to initiate the attack. In a case such as this, the autorun locations could prove that the system had a trojan backdoor installed leaving it vulnerable for an attacker to use at their discretion.
List of common autorun locations:
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runonce
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\Explorer\Run
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Run
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
(ProfilePath)\Start Menu\Programs\Startup

MRU lists
MRU, or 'most recently used' lists contain entries made due to specific actions performed by the user. There are numerous MRU lists located throughout various Registry keys. The Registry maintains these lists of items incase the user returns to them in the future. It is basically similar to how the history and cookies act to a web browser. One example of an MRU list located in the Windows Registry is the RunMRU key. When a user types a command into the 'Run' box via the Start menu, the entry is added to this Registry key. The location of this key is HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU and its contents can be seen in Figure 2. The chronological order of applications executed via 'Run' can be determined by looking at the Data column of the 'MRUList' value. The first letter of this is 'g', which tells us that the last command typed in the 'Run' window was to execute notepad. Also, the LastWrite time of the RunMRU key will correlate with the last application executed in 'Run', or in this case application 'g'.
With the information provided from the RunMRU key, an examiner can gain a better understanding of the user they are investigating and the applications that are being used. In reference to Figure 2, it is apparent the user has sufficient knowledge of the Windows operating system - based on applications that have been executed, such as msconfig, cmd, sysedit, and regedit.

Figure 2 - RunMRU key

UserAssist
The UserAssist key, HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion \Explorer\UserAssist, contains two or more subkeys which have long hexadecimal names that appear as globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). Each subkey records values that pertain to specific objects the user has accessed on the system, such as Control Panel applets, shortcut files, programs, etc. These values however, are encoded using a ROT- 13 encryption algorithm, sometimes known as a Caesar cipher. This particular encryption technique is quite easy to decipher, as each character is substituted with the character 13 spaces away from it in the ASCII table. A much faster and easier method to decipher this code is with the use of an online ROT-13 decoder, such as http://www.edoceo.com/utilis/rot13.php.

Figure 3 - UserAssist Key

Figure 3a - ROT-13 cipher decoded
With the UserAssist key, a forensic examiner can gain a better understanding of what types of files or applications have been accessed on a particular system. Even though these entries are not definitive, for they cannot be associated with a specific date and time, it may still indicate a specific action by the user.
For instance, in the example of Figures 3 and 3a the decoded value can show a potential amount of information. First, it tells the name of the user profile - 'Cpt. Krunch' - from which the .exe was executed from. Cpt. Krunch could also indicate a handle or an alias of some sort. Second, by researching 'p2ktools.exe', it tells that it is a program used for editing and managing Motorola cell phones. Finally, it shows the user has the p2ktools folder in a parent directory called 'Razor programs', which is located on their desktop. Not only does this give the location of where similar programs may reside, but the name of this directory is a good indicator that the suspect has a Motorola Razor cell phone. If so, that too should be seized for further analysis.

Wireless Networks
Wireless networks today are popular and are only becoming more popular. A wireless ethernet card picks up wireless access points within its range, which are identified by their SSID or service set identifier. When an individual connects to a network or hotspot the SSID is logged within Windows XP as a preferred network connection. Unsurprisingly, this can be found in the Registry in the HKLM\SOFTWARE\ Microsoft\WZCSVC\Parameters\Interfaces key. When opening this Registry key there may be subkeys beneath it, like UserAssist, that look like GUIDs. The contents of these should contain the values 'ActiveSettings' and 'Static#0000'. There may be additional values that begin with 'Static#' and are sequentially numbered. In the binary data of these 'Static#' values are the network SSIDs of all the wireless access points that system has connected to. This can be seen by right clicking the value and selecting 'modify', as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 - SSID 'flynn-net'
In addition to logging the name of the SSID, Windows also logs the network settings of that particular connection - such as the IP address, DHCP domain, subnet mask, etc. The Registry key in which this can be found is HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\ Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\, which is illustrated in Figure 4a.

Figure 4a - Network settings of SSID 'flynn-net'
Based on this wireless network information, a Forensic examiner can determine if a user connected to specific wireless access point, the timeframe, and their IP address they were assigned by the DHCP server. For instance, if it were a case about a child pornography suspect that was war-driving to various network connections and using them illegally, these methods would be very useful. Given the suspect's computer to run an analysis on would make it possible to see what network connections they were using and the IP address that was assigned to further support a subpoena of the ISP.

LAN Computers
Windows XP implements a network mapping tool called My Network Place, which allows users to easily find other users within a LAN or Local Area Network. A computer on a properly configured LAN should be able to display all the users on that network through My Network Place. This list of users or computers, like many other things, is stored in the Registry. Therefore, even after the user is no longer connected to the LAN, the list of devices still remain, including desktop computers, laptops, and printers. The Registry key where this information is stored is HKCU\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComputerDescriptions.
The ComputerDescriptions key is useful in determining whether or not a user was connected to certain computers or belonged to a specific LAN. Figure 5 displays the output of this key.

Figure 5 - List of computers associated with on a LAN

USB Devices
There is sufficient information on this topic to write an entire research paper on, however, for the scope of this paper only the basics will be discussed to show the most relevant Registry keys.
Anytime a device is connected to the Universal Serial Bus (USB), drivers are queried and the device's information is stored into the Registry (i.e., thumb drives). The first important key is HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet00x\Enum\USBSTOR. This key stores the contents of the product and device ID values of any USB device that has ever been connected to the system. Figure 6 reveals the contents of this key. All of which can be interpreted - there lists an ipod, two external hard drives, a digital video camcorder, and several different thumb drives.

Figure 6 - Contents of USBSTOR key
Beneath each device is the Device ID, which is also a serial number. The serial numbers of these devices are a unique value assigned by the manufacturer, much like the MAC address of a network interface card. Therefore, a particular USB device can be identified to determine whether or not it has been connected to other Windows systems. Carvey mentions in his article The Windows Registry as a Forensic Resource, an important consideration to keep in mind regarding USB device IDs. Not every thumb drive will have a serial number. Particularly, those that have an '&' symbol for the second character of the device ID. In reference to Figure 6, the Device ID that is pointed out has a serial number. However, if the '0' was an '&' that would indicate to an examiner that the device doesn't have a designative serial number. An example of a device that doesn't have an assigned serial number can be seen in Figure 6a, a Western Digital 250GB external hard drive.

Figure 6a USB device without a designated Device ID
Knowing what USB devices have been connected to a system can assist an examiner in collecting additional evidence that may be crucial to the investigation.

Mounted Devices
There is a key in the Registry that makes it possible to view each drive associated with the system. The key is HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices and it stores a database of mounted volumes that is used by the NTFS file system. The binary data for each \DosDevices\x: value contains information for identifying each volume. This is demonstrated in Figure 7, where \DosDevice\F: is a mounted volume and listed as 'STORAGE Removable Media'.

Figure 7 Identification of volume \DosDevice\F:
This information can be useful to a digital forensics examiner as it shows the hardware devices that should be connected to the system. Therefore, if a device is shown in the list of MountedDevices and that device isn't physically in the system, it may indicate that the user removed the drive in attempt to conceal the evidence. In this case, the examiner would know they have additional evidence that needs to be seized.

Internet Explorer
Internet Explorer is the native web browser in Windows operating systems. It utilizes the Registry extensively in storage of data, like many applications discussed thus far. Internet Explorer stores its data in the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer key. There are three subkeys within the Internet Explorer key that are most important to the forensic examiner. The first is HKCU\Software\Microsoft\ Internet Explorer\Main. This key stores the user's settings in Internet Explorer. It contains information like search bars, start page, form settings, etc. The second and most important key to a forensic examiner is HKCU\Software\Microsoft\ Internet Explorer\TypedURLs. Figure 8 demonstrates the content of what the TypedURLs key displays.

Figure 8 TypedURLs key
From this data an examiner could conclude that the user possibly has a gmail and hotmail email address, they engage in online banking at tdbanknorth, is interested in digital forensic websites, and that they perhaps go to college at Champlain and have been researching apartments in the area.
The third subkey that may interest an examiner is HKCU\Software\Microsoft\ Internet Explorer\Download Directory. This key reveals the last directory used to store a downloaded file from Internet Explorer, giving the examiner an idea as to the location of where the user stores their files.

Opera, Netscape, and Firefox
It is the best to my knowledge that none of these browsers utilize the Registry in the way that Internet Explorer does. Internet Explorer stores web history in a file called Index.dat, which is referenced in the Windows Registry database - hence the reason we can see the history contents in the TypedURLs key.
Opera on the other hand, stores its history in a file called opera.dir. The default location of this file is C:\Documents and Settings\User Profile\Application Data\Opera\Opera\profile\. Upon installing and using this browser, the only remnants of Opera located in the Registry were install paths. In fact, according to the features of Opera (http://operawiki.info/WhyOpera), two of the many reasons people choose to use this browser is because it doesn't use the registry to store data and the size of it is very small. It is only a 1.8mb executable and according to the 'Add or Remove Programs' applet in Control Panel; the total installation is only 5.33mb.
Like Opera, Netscape and Firefox leave limited footprints (other then install paths) regarding Registry activity. Netscape and Firefox both store web history in a history.dat file, which is in ASCII format and plainly visible when opened. The location for the history.dat file in Firefox is C:\Documents and Settings\User Profile\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\x.default\ and Netscape is C:\Documents and Settings\derrick.farmer\ Application Data\Netscape\NSB\Profiles\x.default\. An in-depth analysis of these browsers is out of the scope of this particular paper as they are not relevant in a Windows Registry examination.

P2P Clients
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks are notorious of providing users with the ability to distribute illegal and sometimes unethical materials. Three popular P2P clients were downloaded, installed, used, and examined for the purpose of this research. The clients that were used are Limewire, Kazaa, and Morpheus.

Limewire
The research conducted on Limewire was somewhat inconclusive in regards to a Registry examination. There were very minimal footprints of user activity and no logs of searches or downloaded files could be found. The most helpful thing discovered in the Registry was install paths of the program. Knowing this information would give the exact location of where to look in the file system. In a default installation of Limewire the location of the install directory is C:\Program Files\Limewire and the share directory is C:\Documents and Settings\User Profile\Shared.

Kazaa
Kazaa, however, was a bit more successful. Two Registry keys of interest were discovered. The first was HKCU\Software\Kazaa, and contained many user settings that could be useful to an investigator. For instance, beneath the Kazaa key there is a subkey called ResultsFilter, which shows the value for the “adult_filter_level”. This setting will filter adult content from search results. If the value of the adult_filter_level is (1) it is enabled and if it is (0) it is disabled. By default Kazaa enables the adult filter, so if this setting is disabled then it's a good indication the user has taken the initiative to do so within the Kazaa options menu. Figure 9 shows the location of this key and the information in which it contains.

Figure 9 Kazaa key
The other Kazaa Registry key that is worth pointing out is HKLM\Software\ Kazaa. This key contains subkeys that hold connection information and the destination directory of the downloaded files, which show that a default installation of Kazaa stores downloaded files to C:\Program Files\Kazaa\My Shared Folder.

Morpheus
Of the three P2P clients that were researched, Morpheus was the only one that kept a log in the Registry of recently searched for keywords or phrases. The location of this key is HKCU\Software\Morpheus\GUI\SearchRecent and can be seen in Figure 10.

Figure 9a Morpheus recent search list
If an examiner is investigating a case where the user is suspected to have used Morpheus to download illegal content, this key could be very useful in seeing exactly the type of material the user was querying.

One Thing in Common
Research of these three P2P clients revealed one Registry key that they all had in common:
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\ FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List This is a list of applications that are allowed 'outside access' by the Windows Firewall that was implicated in SP2. If the P2P programs are not included in this list then they wouldn't be assigned a TCP or UDP port to access the P2P client's server and would consequently be blocked. Therefore, any type of program in use for file sharing purposes should appear on this list. This would be a great place for a forensic examiner to look in determining if the system has other potential file sharing applications that have been overlooked.

Figure 9b Firewall Authorized Applications key

Overview
The following list includes a brief recap of the Registry keys discussed in this paper.
o HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
o HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist
o HKLM\SOFTWARE\ Microsoft\WZCSVC\Parameters\Interfaces
o HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\
o HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ ComputerDescriptions
o HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet00x\Enum\USBSTOR
o HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices
o HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main
o HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs
o HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Download Directory
o HKCU\Software\Kazaa
o HKCU\Software\Morpheus\GUI\SearchRecent
o HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\ FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List
For a comprehensive list of Registry keys that directly relate to a computer forensic examination, many of which were not discussed in this paper, refer to AccessData's PDF document Registry Quick Find Chart.
http://www.accessdata.com/media/en_US/print/papers/wp.Registry_Quick_Find_Chart.en_us.pdf

Conclusion
Given the popularity of the Windows operating system - in homes and businesses - it is important for computer forensic experts to understand the complexity of the Windows Registry. The information and potential evidence that reside in the Registry make it a significant forensic resource; uncovering this data can be crucial to any computer related investigation. By understanding the fundaments of the Registry from a forensics standpoint, an examiner can develop a more precise account on what actions occurred on the given machine. This report is by no means conclusive in terms of a Registry Examination. It presents some explanations and examples of what types of data can be found, how it can be found, and why it may be relevant to an examination. For as long as operating systems are dependent upon the Registry as a configuration database, and for as long as applications continue to use that database for storage, there will always be different locations to discover that provide evidential support in an investigation.

References
Books
Honeycutt, Jerry. Microsoft Windows Registry Guide. 2nd. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Press, 2005.
Kruse, Warren G., and Jay G. Heiser. Computer Forensics: Incident Response Essentials. New York: Addison-Wesley, 2004.
Nelson, Bill, Amelia Phillips, Frank Enfinger, and Christopher Steuart. Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations. 2nd. Canada: Course Technology, 2006.
Journals
Carvey, Harlan. "The Windows Registry as a forensic resource." Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital Forensics & Incident Response 2(2005): 201-05.
Carvey, Harlan, and Cory Altheide. "Tracking USB storage: Analysis of windows artifacts generated by USB storage devices." Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital Forensics & Incident Response 2(2005): 94-100.
Online
Carvey, Harlan. "Windows Incident Response." [Weblog Mounted Devices] 21 Dec 2004. 8 Apr 2007 .
Davies, Peter. "Forensic Analysis of the Windows Registry." Peter Davies. 2006. 3 Feb 2007 .
Jones, Kieth J., and Rohyt Belani. "Web Browser Forensics, Part 1." Security Focus. 30 Mar 2005. 13 Apr 2007 .
Microsoft, "Description of the Microsoft Windows Registry." Help and Support. 27 Jan 2007. Microsoft Corp. 8 Apr 2007 .
Microsoft, "INFO: Working with the FILETIME Structure." Help and Support. 23 Jan 2007. Microsoft Corp. 8 Apr 2007 .
Opera, "Why Choose the Opera Internet Suite'." Operawiki. 2007. 13 Apr 2007 .
'Registry Quick Find Chart." AccessData. 2005. AccessData Corp. 1 Apr 2007 .
"ROT 13 Encoder/Decoder." Consulting, Development, Research, and Support. 2007. Edoceo, inc.. 14 Apr 2007 .
Srinivasan, Ramesh. "Registry MRU Locations." Ramesh’s Site: Troubleshooting Windows. 2006. 14 Apr 2007 .
Websense, "Emerging Threats: Peer-to-Peer File Sharing." Advanced Systems Group. Websense, Inc. 13 Apr 2007 .
Wong, Lih Wern. "Forensic Analysis of the Windows Registry." Forensic Focus. 1 Feb 2007 .

網路購物業的資安防護策略

隨著各種網路購物的詐騙與惡意攻擊行為仍層出不窮,網路購物業者如果缺少適當的防護對策,本文可作為管理人員與資訊人員的參考。

根據資策會產業情報研究所(MIC)的調查顯示,由於2009年發生多起的網路購物資安事件,如何去確保交易資料的安全性,已成為台灣網友認為網路購物需要 改進的前三大項目之一。目前,已有83%的業者提供了簡易的線上交易付款機制,也有將近九成的業者認同保護網路購物交易安全是吸引消費者的重要判斷依據, 並且將有助於銷售業績的提升。

不過,截至目前為止,由網路購物所引發的資安事件依舊層出不窮,例如2009年年底有消費者在購物網站消費 之後,隨即接到詐騙集團的電話,因此懷疑業者將消費購物時所填的個人資料外洩。而某網路書店業者,繼前年發生六千多筆的會員資料外洩之後,也再次發生消費 者在購書之後兩週內,接到詐騙集團電話要求至ATM取消分期手續,因此而損失三萬元存款的事件,讓人質疑業者內部的資料控管仍存有很大的漏洞。

針對網路購物的安全,MIC更進一步指出,網路購物業者必須將「交易安全」視為重要的營運議題,因為日後在消費者期待交易安全將有所改善的情況之下,網路購物的交易安全也將愈來愈受到重視。

網路購物面臨的資安威脅

記 得從2007年開始,在全球各地都發生了網站資料外洩事件,其中以網路購物業的災情最為嚴重,以當時台灣的前十大網路購物業者來說,有一半都傳出因為消費 者的個人資料外洩,而導致一連串的網路詐騙行為發生。根據刑事警察局的統計,光是2007年1~8月所累計的詐騙金額,就超過了三億一千萬,受騙的人數也 將近一萬人,其中大多數都是因為網路購物的個人帳號與交易資料外洩所引起。

目前,網路購物業者所面臨的資安威脅,最常見的有下列幾項:

  1. 阻斷服務攻擊 – 惡意人士透過已受到木馬程式控制的電腦所形成的殭屍網路(BotNet),在很短的時間內針對購物網站發送大量連線封包,使得網站伺服器無法處理同時湧入的連線要求,造成交易服務的中斷,消費者無法連上網站進行購物。
  2. 惡意程式攻擊 – 如果網站業者缺乏資訊安全防護機制,很容易就會被惡意入士在網頁中植入惡意連結,使得瀏覽網站的消費者會自動下載執行病毒和木馬等惡意程式,造成個人隱私資訊包括登入帳號、密碼、信用卡號等被竊取外洩。
  3. 偽冒攻擊 – 惡意人士以網路釣魚的手法,假冒網路購物業者對其會員發送偽造的郵件,藉此騙取會員的帳號資料以行詐騙。另外,惡意人士也會利用竊取的信用卡資料進行購物消費,使業者無法收取款項而蒙受損失。
  4. 連線竊聽 – 如果購物網站業者未使用像是SSL的安全機制網路連線,當消費者在不安全的網路環境中進行購物,惡意人士可伺機竊聽網路交易的封包,進而獲得雙方交易的資訊。
  5. 人員破壞 – 若業者內部員工未經適當的篩選與管理,並且缺少適當的資訊存取控制措施,惡意員工可能會盜賣客戶資料,或是針對系統進行破壞,進而影響網站所提供的購物服務。
  6. 系統入侵 – 惡意人士可能利用網路或主機系統的安全漏洞,透過駭客手法入侵系統,藉由提高其帳號權限,可進一步取得敏感的資訊,或是針對系統埋藏後門,以便進行更多的破壞。

針對購物流程加強防護


對業者而言,如果發生了資安事件,單一的交易損失或許不大,但是當事件經由媒體的報導之後,若讓消費者產生了疑慮,勢必對業者的商譽造成更大的衝擊,可能更讓許多人因此而不願意在該網站上購物,後續的損失可說是難以估計。

針 對網路購物的安全,國際信用卡發卡組織VISA的調查指出,有六成的消費者是透過網站是否有良好的安全系統、業者是否願意免費退貨、是否提供消費者信用卡 不被盜刷的保障,作為判斷網路購物是否安全的依據。而消費者進行網路購物時最怕碰到的三件事,首先是業者不當使用消費者的個人資料,其次是將消費者的個人 資料和信用卡號外洩,最後則是業者受到未經授權的駭客入侵。所以,為了確保營運與獲利,業者應重視網路購物的安全,以保障消費者的權益與信心。

那 麼,業者到底該如何保護網路購物的安全呢?最簡單的方式是,我們可以從網路購物的流程,來一一探討並預防可能會發生的資安問題。現今一般的網路購物流程 為,消費者在瀏覽器上輸入網址或點選連結之後進入購物網站,然後選擇想要購買的物品,接著需填寫個人資料並進行付款,若是以信用卡進行線上交易,則由業者 的系統連結銀行線上交易系統完成付款,最後業者再依照購物明細寄送商品給消費者,讓購物得以順利完成。

從以上的購物過程中,我們就可以從 幾個方向來著手,首先,為了確保消費者連線至網站的過程中,資料不會遭到竊聽,因此業者應採用128位元以上的SSL連線加密機制,以確保資料傳送的安 全。接著,消費者在網站上所填寫的資料,除了必要的會員資訊之外,業者不應保留消費者的信用卡號等資料,若是有特殊狀況需要保留者,則應事先對消費者說 明,並且將敏感資料進行加密,同時進行資料存取的權限管控。

此外,如果購物網站提供了線上刷卡機制,建議應進一步和信用卡公司合作,啟用 個人密碼驗證服務,讓使用者在購物時,除了填寫信用卡號之外,還需要輸入個人密碼,以確認的確是由持卡人進行消費,或是也可以利用手機簡訊發送一次性密碼 至持卡人手機,要求持卡人輸入簡訊中之密碼,以確認為本人進行消費。

在消費者完成信用卡付款之後,業者就會進入貨品遞送的服務流程,若是 外包給第三方的物流業者協助進行,那麼在購物資料的保護上面就要注意,基本上,應該讓物流業者只能獲得購物者的姓名、地址、連絡電話,其他包括購買物品名 稱、價格、購買日期、總金額等資料皆應保密,因為這些資料並不會影響貨品的遞送,也就不需要交給物流公司,否則反而會增加個人資料外洩,受到詐騙集團利用 的風險。

定期檢視並改善安全措施

關 於網路購物的資訊安全,站在業者的角度來看,個人認為主要有三大影響要素,分別是「人員」、「資訊」和「技術」。人員面是指內部人員的作業疏失或擅自揭露 客戶資料;資訊面則包括網站未使用加密機制、網頁內容受到惡意竄改;技術面則為網路遭受阻斷服務攻擊、網站應用程式有安全漏洞、網站伺服器缺少安全防護 等。只要其中有任何一項因素沒有加以注意,那麼業者很容易就會發生資安事件而登上媒體版面。

因此,建議業者利用以上提到的安全檢視方法, 先從作業流程來著手,找出可能的安全問題,以及是否存在安全漏洞。當然,各家業者的作業方式都不會相同,也就需要由業者本身針對既定的作業流程中,可能會 觸及到敏感資訊的人事物,一一地作安全的清查與確認。如果流程方面沒問題了,再針對人員的訓練、資訊的保護、技術的加強,來進一步提升資安的防護。

所 以,網路購物業者的資安防護策略到底是什麼?簡單的說,就是要找出網路購物流程中,可能存在的安全弱點,以及會利用弱點而造成傷害的威脅,然後實施對應的 控制方法來減少弱點並降低威脅,將資安風險降到可接受的程度。最後還要注意在這個過程之中,千萬不要忽略了內部人員的安全訓練,資料的傳遞保護,以及資安 技術的防護,如果能夠確實控管資安風險的話,相信對於網路購物業者,將會創造更多商機,同時建立起消費者的信心與口碑。

(本文刊載於2010年2月號網管 人雜誌)
轉自 資安見聞錄

6 Hex Editors for Malware Analysis

Hex editors allow examining and modifying a file at the low-level of bytes and bits, usually representing the file’s contents in hexadecimal form. Some editors distinguish themselves at helping the user derive meaning from the examined file, extracting ASCII and Unicode contents, searching for patterns, recognizing common structures, and so on. There are lots of hex editors out there; I want to mention a few that I find particularly useful for analyzing malicious software and document files.

FileInsight
FileInsight is a free hex editor from McAfee Labs that runs on Microsoft Windows (download zip file). As expected, it can perform standard hex editor duties, such as viewing and editing file contents in a hex form, but it also does more than that.
FileInsight is able to parse the structure of compiled Windows executables (PE files) and binary Microsoft Office (OLE) documents. Furthermore, the tool has a built-in x86 disassembler: simply point the cursor at the area of the file  you want to treat as code, and the tools will show you the corresponding assembly instructions. The disassembler is especially helpful when looking at shellcode embedded in malicious files.
FileInsight includes numerous other analyst-friendly features, such as the ability to import data structure declarations, HTML syntax highlighting, and tools for decoding various data obfuscation methods (xor, add, shift, Base64, etc.). FileInsight also allows you to automate actions using JavaScript and Python. Nick Harbour wrote several Python plugins for FileInsight, which you can download from his website.
The tool’s biggest weakness is, perhaps, it’s inability to open very large files. For instance, when attempting to load a 512MB file, FileInsight produced a “Failed to open document” error. Also, FileInsight does not support searching for Unicode-encoded strings that look like ASCII strings.

FileInsight in Action

Hex Editor Neo

Hex Editor Neo is available as free and commercial versions for Microsoft Windows from HDD Software. Its freeware version provides typical hex editor features in a friendly and highly-customizable interface, but is not particularly impressive. However, unlike FileInsight, all versions of Hex Editor Neo can open very large files and allows user to look for ASCII and Unicode-encoded strings.
The features of Hex Editor Neo relevant to malware analysis are present in its commercial versions (see version comparison). For instance, the Standard version introduces the support for handling data manipulations, such as decoding, encrypting and deobfuscating using common algorithms. (Notably, these features are included for free in FileInsight.) The Professional version introduces support for viewing and editing local resources, such as NTFS streams, local disks, process memory and physical RAM. The Ultimate version includes scripting support and built-in disassemblers for x86, x64 and .NET code.
FileInsight is probably a better match than Hex Editor Neo for regular malware analysis use. However, Hex Editor Neo’s commercial versions add value to the toolkit by supporting very large files, x64 and .NET disassembly, local resource editing, searching for Unicode strings and extensive customization support of its user interface.
Hex Editor Neo in Action

FlexHex

FlexHex is a powerful commercial hex editor from Heaventools Software that includes many features comparable to commercial versions of Hex Editor Neo, though FlexHex does not support scripting.
FlexHex only stands out from Hex Editor Neo in its ability to parse  binary Microsoft Office (OLE) documents. However, FlexHex might get confused when attempting to parse some malicious OLE files, presenting a “The docfile has been corrupted” error. Overall, this is probably the weakest editor of those examined here from the perspective of a malware analyst.
FlexHex in Action

010 Editor

010 Editor is a commercial hex editor for Microsoft Windows from SweetScape Software. Its core features are comparable to those of the commercial versions of Hex Editor Neo and FileHex: support for very large files, data manipulation, local resource editing, and so on. Like Hex Editor Neo, 010 Editor also supports scripting.
010 Editor shines in its ability to parse various file formats by using a large library of user-contributed templates. This makes it easier for the analyst to navigate various file formats, including Windows executables (PE files), Windows shortcut (LNK) files, Zip archives, Java Class files, and many more. Malware analysts will particularly appreciate the template for parsing PDF files that Didier Stevens created for 010 Editor. You can also download several user-submitted 010 Editor scripts from its website.
010 Editor in Action

Hiew

Hiew is a commercial hex editor by Eugene Suslikov for Microsoft Windows. It is a favorite among many malware researchers due to the powerful features for examining and editing the structure and contents of Windows executables (PE files) and Linux binaries (ELF files). Another very useful feature for reverse-engineering malicious programs is the tool’s ability to disassemble and assemble x86 and x64. Hiew’s disassembler even supports the ARM instruction set. Hiew can handle very large files and edit local logical and physical drives. It supports macros, scripts and even has an API set for additional extension and automation.
It works in a DOS-style console window and is generally unfriendly towards a new user, in comparison to the other hex editors I discussed so far. It’s a powerful hex editor, but is not well-documented. For those who don’t already know how to use it, it probably isn’t the best tool to get started with, given the number of other powerful hex editors and disassemblers available.
Hiew in Action

Radare

Radare is a set of free tools for Unix platforms  that include powerful hex editing capabilities. Radare’s features are too numerous to list here, and include support for examining and tweaking Windows executables (PE files), Linux binaries (ELF files) and Java Class files, comparing binary files, as well as disassembling, reassembling and debugging code. The tool also includes shellcode generator, which is particularly relevant for those who analyze vulnerabilities and exploits. The capabilities of Radare are extensible and scriptable.
The drawback of Radare is that it is a command-line tool that is difficult to master. Fortunately, it includes rather extensive documentation. Radare is of particular interest for analysts who prefer working in Unix environments with command-line tools. (Radare is included in the REMnux distro for malware analysis.)
Radare in Action

Conclusion

We looked at several powerful hex editors that included features useful for analyzing malicious software. Of these, FileInsight stood out for its overall feature set that malware analysts find useful on regular basis. 010 Editor provided a large number of templates for parsing file, including PDF documents, and was highly customizable. FlexHex included support for parsing some binary Microsoft Office (OLE) files, but otherwise did not stand out. Hex Editor Neo expanded the toolkit by being able to disassemble x86, x64 and .NET code. Radare offered comprehensive, but hard-to-use command-line capabilities for Unix platforms. Hiew included powerful features for tinkering with compiled executables, but was not-user friendly.
Hex EditorHighlighted FeaturesHighlighted Limitations
FileInsightBuilt-in x86 disassembler
Many data decoding methods
Scriptable
Parses PE and OLE formats
Free
Cannot handle very large files
Hex Editor NeoBuilt-in x86, x64, .NET disassembler
Many data decoding methods
Handles very large files
Scriptable
Highly-configurable interface
Advanced features in commerical version
FlexHexParses OLE format
Handles large files
Some data decoding methods
Not scriptable
Commercial
010 EditorParses many formats, including PE and PDF
Support for custom parsing templates
Many data decoding methods
Handles very large files
Scriptable
Commercial
HiewBuilt-in x86, x64, etc. disassembler
Built-in reassembler
Handles very large files
Many data decoding methods
Commercial
Hard to use
Not well-documented
RadareBuilt-in x86, x64, etc. disassembler
Built-in reassembler
Handles very large files
Many data decoding methods
Free
Hard to use
Personally, FileInsight and 010 Editor offer the most value for my malware analysis work on Windows and Radare on Unix, leaving FlexHex, Hex Editor Neo and Hiew in the “nice-to-have” category. Of course, everyone has his or her own preferences. What’s your favorite hex editor?

轉自 SANS

QQ 2009/2010 聊天記錄分析測試

轉自 計算機取證技術

一直說到俄羅斯Belkasoft公司的IM Analyser可以支持QQ 2009和QQ 2010的聊天記錄查看,但一直沒有測試成功。今天和Belkasoft公司CEO Yuri在SKYPE上遇到了,並一起測試了最新版本2.0,發現果然可以成功查看2010版的聊天記錄。


趁熱打鐵,把測試過程和遇到的問題和大家交流一下。之前也是測試過幾次,但都不成功,以為他們還沒有徹底解決技術問題。後來才知道可能是他們軟件中的一個BUG,估計下一個版本中就可以修改好了。

過程如下:
測試版本:Belkasoft Forensic Studio Professional Version: 2.0  ( BFSP.ZIP 9327KB)
測試環境:MacOS Parallels Desktop 虛擬機,安裝WINDOWS XP 32位中文版
QQ版本: QQ2010正式版(1720)
其他要求:Microsoft.NET Framework 3.5

下載,安裝就不說了。軟件運行後,可以轉換為中文界面。這個軟件是Sprite一年前漢化的,現在發現有些漢語選詞錯誤,大家包涵著用吧。

1、軟件運行,首先看到註冊畫面。這裡面顯示的是針對SPRITE的機器生成的機器碼。購買軟件的人,只要將這個機器碼返還給軟件公司,就會生成一串唯一 對應的註冊碼。可以激活軟件。請注意生成Hardware ID時候的軟件版本。不同的版本對應的激活碼是不能互換使用的。也就是專業版的註冊碼不可以在標準版的軟件中使用。否則會提示註冊碼無效。



2、如果各位只是想測試一下軟件,那麼選擇演示模式即可。「運行未註冊的軟件」--沒翻譯好。呵呵。選擇之後,軟件會提示只能顯示20條聊天信息。



3、選擇QQ2009/2010,右鍵,選擇「查找該類型聊天記錄」。這個軟件的BUG就在這裡。如果選擇了「打開聊天記錄文件」,過一會調用聊天記錄文件時軟件就會出錯,退出。



4、在出現的下面窗口中,如果選擇第一個選項「所有邏輯磁盤」,那麼查找QQ聊天記錄的時間會非常長,因為軟件要去檢索所有的目錄,如果你的計算機中目錄 很多,可能會搜索1個小時。呵呵。為了快速地定位,我們還是直接指定QQ目錄吧。一般來說,默認的安裝位置是:c:\probram files\Tencent,用戶也有可能自己更換安裝位置,但總的說找到這個位置還是計較簡單的。




5、搜索指定磁盤或目錄,設定好QQ的路徑(不用更加詳細了,這樣設置搜索起來已經非常快了,大約3秒。)選擇確定繼續。



6、3秒之後,軟件自動找到了包含有聊天記錄的目錄。這裡面顯示的是我測試的QQ號碼。如果實際的CASE裡面,可能會出現好幾個QQ號碼,都會顯示在這裡。



7、此時,雙擊QQ2009\2010,可以看到這裡出現了搜索到的QQ號碼。



8、選擇相應的QQ號碼,右鍵,選擇讀取聊天記錄。編碼可以設定中文語言。



9、這裡比較複雜,給大家解釋一下。
第一個C:\,是用戶Windows所在的盤符。我這裡是C盤,所以設定為C。但如果外掛一塊硬盤時候,WINDOWS所在分區的盤符可能為F,那麼需要將這裡設定為F:

第二個選框,是用戶QQ目錄所在反覆,我的QQ保存在C盤,所以也是選擇了C:。但如果設定在D盤,或者外掛一塊硬盤時,QQ位置可能是G:,那麼就需要設定為相應盤符。

第三個選框是WINDOWS註冊表SOFTWARE保存的位置。如果在自己的機器上測試,那麼當前WINDOWS正在運行,SOFTWWARE是被保護 的。IM ANALYZER無法讀取被鎖定的SOFTWARE。此時需要用類似於HOBOCOPY的工具,或者有WINHEX或者X-WAYS FORENSICS的朋友可以用這兩個軟件將SOFTWARE拷貝至某個目錄中備用。


有關SOFTWARE的拷貝方法如下:
a:  SOFTWARE的位置:


B: HOBOCOPY的使用方法:紅色標註的即為命令行。



10、

讀取成功後,測試QQ號碼顯示為綠色。雙擊這個號碼,可以看到包含聊天記錄的號碼和聊天內容。

11、此時可以看到測試的聊天內容。其實操作正確後還是很簡單的。讀取速度也是很快。中文支持很好。顯示時間也是準確的。其中O表示OUT,即發出的信息,也就是我測試的QQ號碼,機主。I表示IN,即接收的信息,即和我聊天的人,圖中顯示為7414XXXX的人。


不足:
群記錄無法分析。Belkasoft答應繼續分析。
好友列表無法顯示。
可以解決部分問題,但無法解決QQ2010的全部問題。

但不足歸不足,終究這是Sprite所看到的唯一一個可以查看到聊天記錄的工具。能解決一點,總比一點都不能解決好吧。